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The Digital General: Reflections on Leadership in the Post-Information
Age
PAUL T. HARIG

From Parameters, Autumn 1996, pp. 133-140. .
Onward from the Digital Child
As I compose this introduction, one of my children is playing on a hand-held video game that contains more memory
than the first computer I had access to in graduate school. My other child is on-line to her friends somewhere on the
Internet. At the same time, 300 lieutenant colonels and colonels are converging on Carlisle, Pennsylvania, to begin
their formal education in senior leadership at the US Army War College. I am imagining how these events intersect.
Perhaps 30 years from now, when the generation of digital colonels in the Army War College Class of 2026 embark on
a well-worn path in Eisenhower's footsteps, we will see the effects of the Information Age that started for them when
they were playing video games and "surfing the net" as kids in 1996.
Perhaps the future will look much as it does today and did 500 years ago. A colleague reminds me that with the
tremendous advancements in technology, organizations, and doctrine, command is still very personal.[1] He writes,
"Consider Schwarzkopf, alone in his bunker, making the decision to start the ground war in the Gulf, and contrast the
moment with Eisenhower on the eve of D-Day. The modern general has state-of-the-art technology light years ahead
of what Eisenhower had available to him, yet both faced the same questions--Is it time? Has enough been done to
ensure the success of the attack? Both had huge staffs manned with the best minds they could assemble; both sought
and used the best intelligence they had available to them, but the decision to commit forces to the offensive in the end
was largely intuitive, personal, and private--In my judgment, the time is right." In the end, it could be argued, all great
commanders are the same. They adapt the technology of their times in a highly personal, reflective space where
machines can extend, but never supplant, the human dimension of their leadership.
My colleague's point is clear: there will always be a human dimension to leadership. The most successful commanders
will be those who possess a few basic traits: courage, intellect, and a cultivated sense of intuition. If that commander
doesn't even know how to turn on a computer, it matters not. That is a comforting speculation, and there are abundant
examples in the biographies of the great captains to support it. Yet, I have a nagging concern for that batch of "digital
generals" 35 years from now.[2] I wonder if the cultural transformation between now and then might be so profound,
so revolutionary, that these future leaders will follow along the path described above? I also wonder if high technology
might have a corrosive effect upon their command, in the way that "management" might have corrupted leadership to
produce the zero-defects mentality.
I am not a Luddite; I embrace technology for its extensions to my senses, my muscles, and my intellect. But I am a
child of the late 1940s, and my view of technology is conditioned by my experience, constructed in a Newtonian
culture of linear, cause-and-effect relationships and predictable consequences. I learned from television as it
developed, but spent as much time with radio and records, books and newspapers to form a worldview. I have
experienced (and circumscribed) technology as an exciting stream of tools which could improve without necessarily
perturbing the natural order of things. It was only recently that this relationship has been exploded by technology's
capacity to interact with and remodel human events in real time (exemplified by the effects of televised combat and
talk-show politics that shape public opinion and mold policy), fulfilling Marshal McLuhan's prophesy that "the
medium is the message"[3] while shifting social attitudes and behavior. From that perspective, one must ask whether
technology's ultimate effect upon future senior leaders could go far beyond providing an enhanced warfighter toolbox.
Is something else there that will transform the human dimension of the "digital general" too?
The Medium Might Rewrite the Message

It is difficult to understand a revolution from the inside-out. We comprehend change through historical trends and
visualize the unfamiliar through familiar patterns. Thus, the "revolution in military affairs," considered a qualitatively
new capability to see, understand, and respond to a changing military situation, is being framed and understood in the
"traditional" language of computer systems. One view is that the microprocessor is another powerful tool to integrate
knowledge, a system-of-systems to help dissipate the fog of war.[4] But what if the microprocessor is but an icon for a
more fundamental conceptual revolution that is occurring? What if technology is shaping a real social and cultural
transformation? Could the Information Age be more than improved tools? Can other changes be far behind?
In his essay on military decisionmaking in the Information Age, Professor Thomas Czerwinski forecasts a transition to
a style of "command by influence" in which the military leader would communicate mission-type orders through
symbolic imagery rather than voice or text, leveraging subordinates' initiative to exploit chaos through greater
situational awareness.[5] I speculate that the digital general some 35 years from now might not just communicate
differently but will actually think differently from his or her predecessors, because conceptual behavior itself is
evolving during the Information Age.
The evidence that a threshold may have been crossed is found in a steady worldwide rise in intelligence test
performance. The psychologist James Flynn first demonstrated that IQ has been going up ever since testing began. The
"Flynn effect" is now well documented in many technologically advanced countries: the average gain is about three IQ
points per decade, more than a full standard deviation since the last generation of military leadership was born.
According to the report of a task force established by the American Psychological Association,[6] the consistent
intelligence score gains documented by Flynn seem much too large to be explained by simple increases in test
sophistication. Yet, their cause is presently unknown. According to the task force, the most plausible explanation is
based upon striking cultural differences between successive generations: the population is increasingly urbanized;
television exposes us to more information and more perspectives on topics than ever before; children stay in school
longer; and everyone is exposed to new forms of experience. In short, complexity of life may produce corresponding
changes in complexity of mind.
It will be no surprise to one who has watched school-age children "surf the net" that information technology has jolted
our culture, promoting access to ideas and immediacy to events, leading to mastery of resources. Without leaving his
room, a 12-year-old can "cyberchat" or correspond worldwide with e-mail pals, download a computer game, compile
references from university libraries for homework papers, or view a music video.
Adults are often astounded at their children's facility with this high technology. To someone who witnessed a social
transformation driven by television, this capability is considered revolutionary, a "paradigm shift." But paradigms shift
only on the margin--to the youngster who played Super Mario Brothers® or Sonic the Hedgehog® at age five, this
new information technology is just an incremental change, a step up from the SegaÔ or NintendoÔ, but hardly a
revolution in his or her eyes; something "cooler" will always come along. Keep in mind that these children are the
senior leaders in the "Army After Next"; their grandchildren will be even more dissimilar to us.
Transformed Minds, Transformed Culture
As technology transforms the culture, it also shifts expectations and perceptions, and this is the heart of the conceptual
transformation from pre- to post-microprocessor generations. Let me enumerate a few elements of this shift:
Information management and manipulation are replacing knowledge acquisition and inference. The exponential
growth of information and the methods for acquiring it have transformed the meaning of expertise. In the past, an
expert was the repository of facts. Experts "learned" how to become experts by acquiring those facts and by learning
how to distinguish truth. But there are now too many facts, too much stored information, too many sources. Experts
are now defined by their ability to recognize underlying patterns so that new facts can be acquired and integrated.
Experts learn how to match these underlying patterns or heuristics to new data sources in order to advance composite
knowledge.
Within the Internet, for example, some of the most active enterprises are "World Wide Web search engines." These
programs range from simple semantic filters which dredge related items from the millions of pages of stored data, to

keyword systems which group and retrieve sources according to underlying patterns and themes. As a cursory
examination of these systems will demonstrate, there is no shortage of information on any imaginable subject; one
such system boasts access to 50 million pages of information. Hence, it is becoming ever more important to know what
to ask for, and increasing status is being accorded to those who can efficiently frame a search strategy to a question
while avoiding becoming overwhelmed by the possible answers. Likewise, information manipulation has become a
central academic objective--rather than presenting students with a static set of facts, instructors are challenging their
students to learn the interrogation process themselves to harvest their own answers. The result is a generation that is
comfortable navigating numerous, complex data sets.
Of course, there are risks in this activity. On the Internet, information is plentiful but not necessarily genuine or
reliable. Searching is a recursive project which involves trial and error. Most "search engines" score the accuracy of a
selection, or "hit," by the likelihood that the result matches the search template. This is not, I would assert, analogous
to finding the truth. Accuracy of retrieval is generally determined by how well a piece of information is indexed for
retrieval, not by its internal validity. Consequently, on the Internet it is possible to retrieve erroneous information
correctly, and to deceive others with bogus "facts" or rumor freely distributed throughout cyberspace.
The real problem of going from inference to data management is that as much emphasis can be placed on the process
as on the product of a search. That could engender a shaky practice: seek until you find, but generally accept what
meets your expectations. The corollary, "If you didn't find it, you didn't ask for it the right way," can shape the process
of inquiry into merely proving one's expectations, a cybernetic prejudice that suspends critical analysis and evaluation
of the results. A related pitfall is uncritical acceptance of results, i.e. confusing process for product: "If my search
strategy returned an answer, it must be a correct one." The perils of uncritical thinking are compounded by some
innate characteristics of the Internet: it is voluminous, it is uncensored, and it can be counterfeit. With so much
information available, efficiency has priority over reliability, hence the popularity of the search engines. Yet, there is
rarely a day that counterfeit material is not posted somewhere (or reposted, multiplying its weight to the search
engines). Unfortunately, the information age provides no easy answer to this problem, but presents an abundance of
hazards for the uncritical thinker who uses technology to make his decisions. "Let the buyer beware!" will take on
more significance in a data-intensive Information Age.
The basis for learning is changing. In the pre-microchip generation, lessons learned were generated from directly
experienced real-world consequences. The tutelage of mentors was prized because they had learned the tricks and traps
of the trade through personal or vicarious experience and handed them down through education. The most valuable
mentors were guardians of institutional memory, who could act like harbor pilots to guide novices to a solution
because they knew where the shallow straits were located, perhaps because they had once run aground themselves.
(One of the interesting sidelights here is the pressure for increased self-reliance caused by the disappearance of
institutional memory, a result of force realignments and the inevitable attrition of seasoned veterans who stood in the
past as mentors.)
By contrast, the information age has facilitated virtual reality--self-discovery through simulation of actual situations,
events, and problems. Given data on the real-world parameters, computers can model sensory cues and contingencies,
support gaming of choice alternatives, and simulate appropriate consequences. Moreover, these simulations can
harmlessly mimic reality so that actual disaster is never experienced as a consequence. This is their key advantage, of
course. Incremental learning or proficiency can be developed by stopping or restarting the process at will, completely
erasing the damage of a previous mistake.
As data storage and processing power increases, the boundary between simulation and reality becomes even less
distinguishable. Witness the power of computer animation in such popular films as Jurassic Park, Forrest Gump, and
Twister, or the realism of mechanical simulation in the new Boeing 777 training module. In military affairs, this
capability to simulate reality has been employed to construct a "virtual theater of war" which seamlessly combines real
units and simulated ones to test doctrinal concepts and materiel effectiveness through simulated operational and
tactical maneuvers.
When reality and simulation become indistinguishable, is there an indelible effect on the player that desensitizes him to
the damage of real-world catastrophes? When harm and pain exist chiefly in cyberspace as immaterial states, can a

player fail to develop sympathy for real-world consequences? The allure of virtual reality could have a dark side--the
blunting of the human sentiments to real war that is fought abstractly, in a manner not too different from counterpart
recreational games. Could advanced technology, the increasing digitization of the battlefield, and the automation of
combat systems transform the experience of war into another video arcade game, an abstraction defined by the
movement and deletion of computer icons? In my opinion, the answers are not clear-cut, but today's most popular
computer games have martial themes, and more are on the way. The story is told of an officer who, in the pitch of
virtual battle, swore at his terminal, "Damn, I lost an icon!" as an overrun battalion was flagged by the computer. Even
if the story is apocryphal, the potential for the response clearly exists in cyberwar.
Systematic decisionmaking is eclipsing intuition. Computers that beat chess masters prove that artificial intelligence
and knowledge-based systems are capable of extremely sophisticated decisionmaking. Programs that apply experts'
collective rules of thumb have even been shown to make more consistent, reliable decisions than humans in similar
problem-solving situations. Yet most expert systems operate from data-hungry mathematical models. They illustrate
the inseparable relationship between knowledge and intelligence--the more you know, the smarter you become; so to
become smarter, you must know even more.
If the quantity of evidence determines the certainty of a hypothesis, then how much evidence is enough? The answer is
determined by the amount of ambiguity in the problem, because computers reason in all-or-nothing terms and have
limited tolerance for partial evidence. Uncertainty is resolved by redundant observations, so that more data is collected
to resolve the uncertainty. Ironically, systems that can scan a situation in great depth and analyze in great precision can
provide a decisionmaker with so much capability that he becomes addicted to the information and consequently
paralyzed by it. Recently, the Army Times described a computer-assisted exercise during which a battle staff hadn't
noticed it was being overrun by the enemy because the commander was preoccupied with obtaining more data from his
battlefield computer.[7]
Through technology, it is not only possible to suffer paralysis by analysis, but also to neglect the intuitive skills that
give commanders an important advantage in ambiguous situations. The author of a recent Military Review essay
observes that intuition allows a commander to focus rapidly on feasible solutions when time for systematic analysis is
unavailable.[8] This capacity is particularly important in peacekeeping, where the traditional combat decisionmaking
model does not fit. But, as that writer notes, intuition comes largely from experience with a broad base of situations.
Overreliance on structured systems might, indeed, stunt the growth of this intellectual capacity and severely limit a
commander's options in unfamiliar scenarios. One of the worst possible outcomes would be the erosion of a leader's
ability to use his own eyes and ears. While decision systems might present an unparalleled opportunity to eliminate
risks, they could obscure a strategic leader's awareness of key inputs to the decisionmaking process which exist
outside the range of data available through computers. Assessment of political and environmental conditions, for
example, will rarely be carried out through the systems of sensors that will generate most of the input to Force XXI
computers.[9]
A Hubris in the Information Age
One of the particular ironies of the Information Age is that the shifts in expectations and perceptions cataloged here
may create and support superb battle staff officers, because these men and women of the future will know how to
leverage powerful analytical tools for tremendous advantages in speed, precision, and effect. Yet, these
transformations also could supply a hubris for the digital general because they make it more difficult to shift from the
operational to the strategic level of leadership.
In the worst case, an officer corps mesmerized by high technology could produce a generation of senior leaders that is
so insecure without their computer models and decision systems that they could not step beyond them. That could have
dire consequences:
Reluctance to "break out of the box." When any formal data system becomes a leader's primary commodity for
strategic decisions, the demand for hard evidence can become the enemy of hunches, eventually suppressing new
perspectives on a situation. A senior leader's experience shouldn't be entrapped by rigid analytical systems that force a
choice from options in all of which ambiguity is a common circumstance. In fact, strategic leaders need some personal

distance from hard data in order to sample other channels of reality, such as having face-to-face discussions to sound
out the feelings behind the pros and cons of an issue.
Death of the metaphor. Just as there are plentiful examples where critical scientific breakthroughs have occurred while
the right brain (our intuitive, pre-verbal cognitive resource) was operating ahead of the pack, strategic vision requires
an ability to think in metaphors, to seek related patterns in unrelated objects, situations, and events. True, our future
senior leaders will have access to more information. The successful ones will be those who are best able to sort out the
important from the interesting. The development and testing of analogies--the patterns that allow leaders to see the
important under data overload, is a skill that could waste away under a sterile diet of expert systems and virtual reality
simulations.
Fear of risk and error. I doubt that the best microchip will ever exceed the value of "Kentucky windage" in
decisionmaking, but the illusion of omniscience from multisensory information systems might make our leaders fear
the "guesstimate," preferring to avoid risking mistakes by substituting certainty models for their intuition.
The Way Ahead or the Way Out?
No one can reliably predict whether technology-driven changes will necessarily impair the human dimension of senior
leadership; possible negative consequences are so averse, however, that it is important to plan to prevent them. That
implies at least two steps: first, to monitor the penetration of "digital thinking" in our youth and assess its effects on
the young solders who operate our battle systems. Second, to assert the value of intuition, risk-taking, and creative
thinking throughout our professional military education process. The first step recognizes that we may not yet see the
phenomenon in our current commanders--they come from a different generation of technology and culture. With the
real leading edge of the cultural revolution completing elementary school, we must plan now to meet this generation at
the doorway, prepared to stress values that might be submerged in their experience and prepared to cultivate abilities
that will make them effective "digital generals" in their own time.
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